Stanley Kurtz has an incredible article in the Jun 02 issue of Policy Review entitled "The Future of History." The article is a BRILLIANT, well reasoned comparison / contrast between 2 of my recent favorite books -- The End of History and the Last Man by Francis Fukuyama and Clash of Civilizations by Samuel Huntington.   I read the article when it was originally published in Summer '02 and have been interested in adding it to my Blog for some time. 

Both books have significantly influenced my thinking although in different ways.   Clash of Civilizations is more oriented around hard facts and "current data" on various cultures around the world, and, as a result has an almost reference-like quality. 

By contrast, End of History is the more timeless of the two and is a generalized discourse on political philosophy.   Many of the memes in End of History directly codify my personal transition from a Nozick-style Anarcho-Capitalist in my younger years to a more classical libertarian world view and finally towards my current views which are somewhat Libertarian/Liberal on domestic issues and Libertarian/Conservative internationally.

Kurtz starts by proclaiming Huntington's world view (apparently) triumphant but in a victory that rings somewhat hollow:

This is Samuel P. Huntington’s moment. The world of cultural and religious strife anticipated by Huntington in his much-discussed (and widely excoriated) book, The Clash of Civilizations, has unquestionably arrived. Yet whether we might also someday see an alternative world — the global triumph of democracy envisioned in Francis Fukuyama’s brilliant work, The End of History and the Last Man — is also a question that seems very much before us as we contemplate what it would mean to “win” the war in which we are engaged.

So it would seem that Huntington provides us with the rationale for Western conflict with the Islamofascist world but it isn't particularly prescriptive on how conflict should play out.  Kurtz captures the following, brilliant quote from Huntington as an example of his insights into the World As It Is:

The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power. The problem for Islam is not the CIA or the U.S. Department of Defense. It is the West, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the universality of their culture.

Fukuyama is, of course, a particularly egregious example of someone who indulges in the Universalist conceit.  The entire thesis of the End of History is the notion that twin pillars of Democracy + Capitalism -- which coincidentally have reached their current pinnacle of evolution in the West -- are the natural end products of civilizational evolution across the world.

When Fukuyama's thesis is faced with notions such as Zakaria's Illiberal Democracy, (partially discussed in one of my earlier blogposts here), Kurtz writes:

...Fukuyama points out that Islamism is an inherently parochial phenomenon, not a universal ideology that can serve as an authentic rival to democracy. So Fukuyama maintains that, while the revolt against modernity in parts of the Muslim world may briefly slow the spread of democracy and capitalism, it cannot ultimately halt or replace it.

Fukuyama argues that the underlying, "more human" motivation of "Dignity" or "Recognition" provides the basic drive towards Capitalism + Democracy.  Fukuyama lays out his arguments here extremely well by invoking the German philosopher Hegel and just these core passages within his book justify the cover price several times over:

...Communist dictatorships and capitalist autocracies alike rob human beings of their dignity, and Fukuyama successfully shows how the growing turn toward democracy in both types of society is not simply a demand for wealth but, at the deepest level, an insistence upon equal personal dignity and recognition.

This is where Fukuyama is often characterized as a "humanist".   Fukuyama's individuals aren't merely economic actors who find their fulfillment driving SUVs and playing video games but instead need highly specialized types of human/social bonding which manifest themselves all the way up into global governance.

Throughout his well argued article, Kurtz isn't merely tallying votes for and against Huntington vs. Fukuyama in the nearly 10 years since their works were published.   One of the key ideas that he contributes to the debate is whether "traditional societies" provide a social organization that similarly reaches deep motivations and therefore, will persist for the indefinite future

...while Hegel’s story brilliantly illuminates the dynamics of decrepit communist dictatorships, the parable nonetheless falls flat as an account of life in other large areas of the world: those known as “traditional” societies. Fukuyama treats traditional societies as simple variants of slave-states or dictatorships, where recognition is granted to a supreme leader or a small ruling class, and the humanity of the masses is denied. Yet that is far too simple an account of the actual distribution of recognition in traditional societies.

And herein lies one of the core axiomatic differences between Huntington and Fukyuama's world views.   Huntington fundamentally treats "traditional" social organizations as an endpoint in and of itself; and therefore, a fundamental source of friction towards the West (albeit at an arguably lower potential).   By contrast, Fukuyama treats this social organization as a way point en route to a more anonymous, individualistic democratic system.

This core difference (along with a few others) translate into radically different ideas about the goals of American foreign policy:

...Fukuyama wants to see America actively promote democracy abroad. Huntington, on the other hand, ever the realist, warns about the potentially disastrous effects of an arrogant and naive democratic imperialism.

At first glance, one may be tempted to say that Huntington's counter argument has an almost Post-Modernist-inspired view.    However, while Huntington may share one aspect of this view, he is unequivocal about his beliefs as to which model is superior (EXTREMELY non-Post-Modernist):

...Huntington wants the West to defend its democratic traditions as a specifically Western cultural heritage, not as magical solutions to the problems of the world. The trouble, one might say, is that it’s not in our culture to see our culture as simply a culture. Huntington’s anti-universalist realism, even insofar as it may be correct, will always be “counter-cultural” policy in an inherently missionizing Western democracy.

Huntington is in effect saying "Democracy and Capitalism are GREAT things... and the Western societal model is the only one that's really compatible with it.   We should be content to simply hold on to them for ourselves and defend them from those who don't favor these institutions."  

Only semi-sarcastically, I'd argue that much PoMo international sentiment is the counterpoint to this -- "Democracy and capitalism are evil;   western society needs to be re-engineered to get rid of our proclivity towards these evils;   we need to change ourselves to become more compatible with others"   (NOTE:  few PoMos' would state outright that they believe Democracy to be evil;  their actions, however, tend to favor governance by a technocratic elite and a regime of significant positive rights which necessarily impinge on Liberal Democracy).

Similarly, Fukuyama's insistence on dignity and chastisement of "capitalist autocracies" has some resonance with messages in the Anti-Globalization movement.  However Fukuyama is also still a broad capitalism defender, not detractor.

Let's take a look at what Fukuyama has to say here as interpreted by Kurtz.   As stated earlier, Fukuyama argues that a greater degree of individualism will be a natural by product of "modernization."    Huntington/Kurtz combat this by using the Western historical example and the Islamic, modern, counter example:

...Huntington rightly points out that the West’s cultural individualism predates modernity and cannot be treated as entirely synonymous with it...In contrast to Fukuyama’s expectations of a quick and easy link between economic and technological modernization, urbanization, and cultural individualism, a traditional kinship structure has reconstituted itself at the center of the great urban migration that is driving the spread of Islamism.

Perhaps the easiest way to rectify these 2 viewpoints is to stagger them.  First, we treat the world as Huntington would and from there, we move to Fukuyama's model:

...Fukuyama can fall back on his confidence in the eventual triumph of democracy and remind us that he never said that universal democratization would come swiftly or easily, only that democracy is the sole remaining political ideology with universal potential...  Huntington explicitly notes that his proposed foreign policy paradigm will likely be every bit as time-limited as was the Cold War paradigm that preceded it. So conceivably, Fukuyama could be correct about the long term, while Huntington could nonetheless be correct about the next several decades. Yet that would leave Fukuyama’s policy proposals in tatters.

This integration of the two viewpoints can be seen in debates about the future of Iraq.

Huntington would likely argue in favor of preemption as a means of neutralizing a threat to Western institutions.   However, as stated earlier, once Iraq had been "crushed", Huntington isn't particularly prescriptive as to what we should do with the country.   His theory would probably imply a long term situation of a cold war-like containment of the country.  Huntington would argue that as long as clan-like loyalties dominate the social fabric, imposing our institutions simply won't stick.

Fukuyama wouldn't say much about whether to pre-empt and attack.   However, if we "owned" Iraq, Fukuyama would move aggressively towards establishment of western-style institutions like constitutional courts, banking, etc. within the country.  Fukuyama would operate under the theory that younger minds in Iraq consider themselves oppressed by government and familial norms and seek western-style, almost Bohemian, liberation.

This situation presents us with an opportunity to "split the difference" between the 2 poles.   Many blogs (Den Beste in particular) have argued that the real mold for battle & its aftermath with Iraq will be WWII and Germany/Japan.   Their prescription is a short, intense, crushing (to the enemy) war.  This would be followed by somewhat long term post-war occupation and direct operation by the US/UN of key governmental structures.  

The crushing war is argued as necessary -- as it was in Germany/Japan -- to instill a type of cultural self-doubt that will in turn (theoretically) lead to a receptiveness towards social organization along alternate, Fukuyama-style lines.  In short a new style of explicit cultural imperialism that seems to borrow from both intellectual camps -- where Huntington says that culture impedes Democracy + Capitalism, the argument is that war can change a culture.   Once we have a (nearly) blank slate to work with, Fukuyama diagrams the World As It Should Be.

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