Just to recap, the cornerstone of counter-insurgency (COIN) warfare is to "separate the insurgent from the host population".   The enemy's entire operating system is predicated on the ability to gain some level tactical, strategic, and eventually, spiritual support from the population they're within.   Tactical separation was well illustrated in the fight against Moqtada Al Sadr last summer when coalition forces first drove him from Sadr City before eventually engaging them.  If they can't rely on the farmer next door to offer logistical support, their ability to fight crumbles.

But more important than this is political and spiritual separation.  The insurgency only works if enough folks in the host population believe in the vision for the future they're trying to sell.   Wanton violence alone does have its place - afterall, Khalid Sheik Mohammed infamously said that he dreamed up 9/11 in part from seeing the press coverage afforded the 1993 WTC bombing.   And there's no question that this act in and of itself managed to rally quite a few bored, post-adolescent boys to the cause. 

BUT, you eventually have to go beyond demonstrating tactical violence into discussing strategic and political goals.   And that is ultimately what the fight against Al Qaeda and its ilk are all about.   They've articulated one path out of the Arab Swamp.   In Iraq, we're demonstrating another. 

The beauty of the Iraqi vote wasn't merely the huge symbolic demonstration of Arabs making decisions democratically but rather the response it forced from our opponents.   A manager back at Microsoft whom I admired tremendously said that a secret to Microsoft's success was choosing competitors who could be counted on to screw up.  Success can oftem come from a ball in your enemy's court.   For Zarqawi, the prospect of a nation of 25M about to vote democratically was such a huge bright yellow tennis ball in his court that it forced a response which ultimately become a tremendous political blunder -

An Internet recording claiming to be from wanted terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi condemned democracy as "the big American lie" on Sunday and said participants in Iraq's January 30 election are enemies of Islam.

..."We have declared a bitter war against democracy and all those who seek to enact it," said the speaker in the 35-minute message.

...Zarqawi has made a bit of a propaganda error here and set himself up for a situation where his "opponents" can individually slap him in the face simply by dropping a ballot.

And millions of Iraqi's slapped him.  Against this backdrop, StrategyPage presents a strategic / political snapshot on Al Qaeda today -

 March 10, 2005: Al Qaeda is trying to deal with a public relations disaster. First, al Qaeda publicly announced, before the January 30th elections, that democracy was un-Islamic. When most Iraqis energetically turned out to vote, the damage to al Qaeda's prestige was considerable. Then there are the suicide bombs that miss their targets. Most of them kill Iraqi civilians, instead of Americans (the preferred target) or Iraqi police, troops or government officials (an acceptable substitute). This has gotten so bad that al Qaeda has tried to deny responsibility for some of the suicide bomb attacks that go spectacularly wrong. The most spectacular recent example was the February 28 attack that killed over 130 people, including children. It had all the signs of a typical al Qaeda bombing, but the explosion, as was often the case, caught a lot of civilians, in addition to police recruits that were the primary target. Al Qaeda attempts to deny responsibility, usually via web sites, are openly mocked by Iraqis. This is making al Qaeda public enemy number one in Iraq, and making it harder to recruit Iraqis to help out, or foreigners to carry out most of the suicide attacks. The Arab tendency to believe outrageous rumors, which worked against the coalition initially, is now being turned on al Qaeda and the Baath Party terrorists. The killing goes on, but the killers get less and less respect. In similar situations in other Arab countries, particularly Egypt in the early 1990s, this led to terrorist groups having to flee the country. Without public support, or at least public indifference, terrorists cannot survive long. 

It's certainly too early to pop the champagne - as the old Military motto goes, in war your enemy gets a vote - Al Qaeda will eventually attempt a counter move.  Still, perhaps we can take a moment to appreciate how well the nearly 100 yr old COIN doctrine is playing out before our eyes.