Andrew Sulllivan hits us with this series of headlines -

"At least 12,000 American troops and probably more should leave at once, to send a stronger signal about our intentions and to ease the pervasive sense of occupation." (Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.), January 27, 2005).

"America's willful defeatists — led by Senator Ted Kennedy, who chose to declare our cause all but lost just days before this historic vote — look particularly puny in light of the millions who turned out to vote because they believe in the new Iraq." (National Review Online, January 31, 2005.)

"WASHINGTON (AP) -- Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz says that with the election in Iraq over he believes 15,000 U.S. troops can be withdrawn, reducing the American military force to 135,000." (Associated Press, February 4, 2005).

Oh the delicious irony.   The scathing hypocrisy.  Not.

I'm generally a fan of Andrew's but his whining has been bugging me a bit of late.   A good chunk of it is that while I think his domestic politics are right on the mark - particularly when matters of principle and morality are at stake - he doesn't seem to get it as much when the question is instead one of game theory, confrontation, and military history.   Game theory in particular is pretty hard for many folks (esp. of a Liberal bend) to grasp because it so explicitly requires a hard-nosed two-faceness which they consider, well, mean & duplicitous.  

When you go into life with a Kantian Good Will Ethic, this sort of stuff is as Bad Karma as you can get.  And if there's one thing these folks avoid, it's Bad Karma.  The problem is that life itself creates many situations where you have to ask for one thing (for ex., Mutual Assured Destruction) in order to get something that's quite nearly its opposite (50 years of relative peace).

The quotes Sullivan highlights above are a great example of this.  You could think of it as the underlying difference is between an outcome and a goal.  Ted Kennedy opposed (at various levels of political expediency) the entire Iraq project and would withdraw almost regardless of the long term impact on Iraq.  The act of withdrawal is an end of itself for Kennedy.   By contrast, Wolfie is noting that given the achievement of a particular outcome -- successful, peaceful 1st round elections -- the stage has been set for an outcome of partial withdrawal.

The ironic thing, of course, is that had the Ted Kennedy view prevailed, the terrorists would - as NRO points out - been emboldened at perhaps greater, rather than reduced, risk to our troops.   A Good Will can often lead to Bad Outcomes.