It's been a long time since I last linked to a Francis Fukuyama article.   Too long.   Since, 9/11, he's been beaten up from the left, right, and center for his famous End of History thesis (including my personal favorite attack by Victor Davis Hanson).   His bout of silence was quite a shame - I still think he's one of the few premier political scientists who begins his theory with empirically observed human nature and draws a trend line towards a rather idealistic conclusion.   He's a "conservative" but far from the "grim" or "dismal" type often caricatured by the San Francisco Left.

This month's Atlantic carries a long, well-thought article from Fukuyama which concludes that regardless of our opinions about Nation Building, it's simply a task we simply can't shirk.   Critics of the task may point towards GI body counts, cultural faultlines, and questions of UN legitimacy BUT -

The fact is that the chief threats to us and to world order come today from weak, collapsed, or failed states. Weak or absent government institutions in developing countries form the thread linking terrorism, refugees, AIDS, and global poverty. Before 9/11 the United States felt it could safely ignore chaos in a far-off place like Afghanistan; but the intersection of religious terrorism and weapons of mass destruction has meant that formerly peripheral areas are now of central concern.

The task isn't easy.   In fact, it's actually quite difficult and there's a finite possibility that it's impossible (particularly if you're a Jeffersonian or American Exceptionalist).   But until we know for sure, Fukuyama argues, we don't have much choice but to try.  Iraq - as much as it hurts - won't be the last time we (either the US or under the aegis fo the UN) are thrust into a nation building role.

Given this fact of life, what's our plan?

Critics of nation-building point out that outsiders can never build nations, if that means creating or repairing all the cultural, social, and historical ties that bind people together as a nation. What we are really talking about is state-building—that is, creating or strengthening such government institutions as armies, police forces, judiciaries, central banks, tax-collection agencies, health and education systems, and the like.

This process has two very separate phases, both of them critical. The first involves stabilizing the country, offering humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, rebuilding the infrastructure, and jump-starting the economy. The second phase begins after stability has been achieved, and consists of creating self-sustaining political and economic institutions that will ultimately permit competent democratic governance and economic growth.

To be sure, Fukuyama IS critical of the way the Bush Administration has handled the task of nation building in Iraq to date.   He cites previous lessons learned for attempts at nation building in the Balkans, Haiti, Somalia, etc. which have gone unheeded to some extent or another in Iraq.   However, Fukuyama's criticism is of the tactical, constructive sort rather than the "toss the baby & the bathwater" alternative proffered by many war critics.   His core policy suggestion is to institutionalize the process of nation building in a government agency:

A standing U.S. government office to manage nation-building will be a hard sell politically, because we are still unreconciled to the idea that we are in the nation-building business for the long haul. However, international relations is no longer just a game played between great powers but one in which what happens inside smaller countries can have a huge effect on the rest of the world. Our "empire" may be a transitional one grounded in democracy and human rights, but our interests dictate that we learn how better to teach other people to govern themselves.

Oh boy... this is a VERY tough one.   I'm skeptical of the folks who, in their guts, believe that the existence of a "War department" is what creates war.   A department for nation building, however, is going to have to be VERY carefully crafted to avoid the accusation that they will merely start hunting for nations to build.