(via JaneGalt)  Daniel Drezner does a GREAT job of discussing the North Korea situation in a blog article.

I broadly agree with his core points with a few exceptions/nuances:

• Airtime vs. importance -- I agree that "this is a more serious problem than Iraq" however, I think many commentators mistake the perceived seriousness of a problem with the amount of airtime devoted to it by the administration. 

  The amount of "airtime" an administration devotes to a particular subject in the press, via highly visible troop movements, statements from allies, etc. is simply one of a stable of diplomatic tools available to policy makers.    Airtime may correlate with the level of importance for a particular policy agenda but not necessarily so.

  North Korea -- and particularily the (pseudo-)allies who help us deal with it like China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea -- are simply better dealt with via old-world style "cloaked diplomacy".    In this context a statement from Powell *saying* that this "is not a crisis" is actually a useful tool and likely a negotiating ploy.  

• Strategic Depth -- versus the general war on Terrorism, the range of retaliatory options and the "depth" of the strategic prisoner's dilemma game is much more complex in the North Korean situation.  Terrorists are truly suicidal while the North Koreans are merely pseudo-suicidal.   As SDB points out, one of the core tenets of the terrorist methodology is provoking reprisal attacks.   North Korea, by contrast is actively building up a retaliatory capability to deter "reprisals" by the West.   

  And let's not forget perhaps the number 1 complication -- nukes.

  When the game gets this deep, classic complex cold-war-esque games of signalling intentions in one direction publically and in a different direction privately and in a 3rd direction with forces on the ground become rational solution sets.

• End of History -- unlike Iraq, we tend to have more faith that the North Korean situation will get swept up in a Fukuyama-esque End of History.   The economy is in absolute shambles and the question is "when" rather than "if" there will be a purely internally-driven collapse.    A liberal democratizing South Korea dramatically improves our ability to manage the Post-Collapse North Korea.   By contrast, the concentrated and literally liquid nature of Oil wealth allows Saddam (and his cronies) to plausibly remain in power indefinitely.   North Korea has no such internal economic lifeline

So, what are we supposed to do?  As Drezner states repeatedly, "all policy options stink".    There is no path the administration can pursue which will avoid giving ground to whiny PoMo apologists who want to accuse the US of duplicitousness and immorality in the short run.